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In The Unnamable, the narrator describes a couple of ‘low types’ who visit him and 
give him ‘the low-down on God’, as well as ‘courses on love, on intelligence’ 
(Beckett, 2010b, 8). In the French text these visitors are ‘sales types’, dirty types 
(Beckett, 1953, 18). Since Beckett described himself as a ‘dirty low-church 
P[rotestant]’ (2009b, 134), and his earliest vice-exister, Belacqua Shuah, as a ‘dirty 
low-down Low Church Protestant high brow’ (2010a, 163), it would seem that the 
Unnamable’s guests are religious and moral educators of the reformed kind.  The 
Unnamable himself, however, is unsure about the value of their preaching: 
 
Some of this rubbish has come in handy on occasions, I don’t deny it, on 
occasions which would never have arisen had they left me in peace. I use it still, 
to scratch my arse with. Low types they must have been, their pockets full of 
poison and antidote. (2010b, 8) 
 
This passage neatly sums up Samuel Beckett’s deeply ambivalent attitude to religion. 
While its dogmas may be ‘rubbish’ and it causes its fair share of problems, aspects of 
it nevertheless prove useful later on. A glance at Beckett’s writing reveals how he 
repeatedly turned to Christian imagery, language and dispositions: his work contains 
an abundance of prayers, allusions to scripture, half-remembered hymns and other 
detritus from the religious life. All of this is well-known, of course, and yet even in 
acknowledging these references in Beckett’s writing the ambivalence itself can get 
forgotten: Beckett can too easily become a closet mystic or a strident anti-theist. In 
this article, I want to return to one of his earliest pieces of writing – the 1934 review 
essay ‘Humanistic Quietism’ (Beckett, 1984, 68–9) – and offer a commentary that 
keeps this ambivalence, we might even say cognitive dissonance, about religion 
firmly in mind. 
 It might not seem obvious why a text as slender as the two pages of ‘Humanistic 
Quietism’ warrants such close scrutiny, and so I will briefly make my case here. The 
essay was published in the July-September issue of The Dublin Magazine and is a 
review of Poems by Beckett’s close friend Thomas McGreevy. Despite its brevity, 
‘Humanistic Quietism’ remains a stubbornly opaque text in which Beckett wilfully 
frustrates his reader with a dense barrage of obscure references, difficult syntax and a 
lack of clarity about his aesthetic allegiances. And not only is this short text replete 
with religious imagery, it emerges from the difference in religious temperament 
between McGreevy – an outspoken Catholic, particularly in matters of aesthetics – 
and Beckett, a ‘dirty low-church P[rotestant] even in poetry’ albeit one who lacked 
‘the least faculty or disposition for the supernatural’ (Beckett, 2009b, 134, 257). 
Although a number of critics have discussed the review in previous studies, there are 
still several knots that remain to be untied. In particular, I argue that Seán Kennedy’s 
reading (2005) of the review does not significantly appreciate Beckett’s religious 
ambivalence, and ends up casting him as antagonistic towards Catholicism and 
therefore surreptitiously critical of McGreevy’s poetics. I will propose that Beckett’s 




Humanism vs. Quietism 
 
The difficulties with this text begin with the title, which seems, as Chris Ackerley 
points out, ‘oxymoronic’ (2000, 88). It is difficult to see how ‘humanism’ could have 
anything to do with the obscure and almost forgotten heresy of ‘quietism’ which 
spread through Spain, Italy, and France in the late seventeenth century. Whereas 
humanism rests on the belief that the human species is capable of steady improvement 
in the spheres of morality, material conditions and knowledge, quietism encourages 
human beings to recognise their worthlessness, impotence, and ignorance, and to 
submit humbly before God. Moreover, while Beckett had a sustained interest in 
quietism during the 1930s (Ackerley, 2000; Feldman, 2009; Nixon, 2011, chap. 3), he 
seems to have had little patience for anything involving humanism. In September 
1934, shortly after submitting the review, Beckett told McGreevy that the 
‘deanthropomorphizations of the artist’ constituted the ‘one bright spot in a 
mechanistic age’ (2009b, 223). This suggests that Beckett’s attribution of ‘humanism’ 
to McGreevy may not exactly be a note of praise. 
  
After the Second World War, Beckett had still harsher words to say about the 
‘human’. In an essay on the paintings of Bram and Geer van Velde, published in 
Cahiers d’art in 1945, Beckett says that ‘l’“humain”’ is ‘un vocable, et sans doute un 
concept aussi, qu’on reserve pour les temps des grands massacres,’ ‘un mot qu’on se 
renvoie aujourd’hui avec une fureur jamais égalée’ [a term, and no doubt a concept as 
well, which is reserved for times of great massacres; a word that returns today with an 
unparalleled anger] (1984, 131, my translation). This term, he adds, has done great 
damage to the world of art in particular. 
 McGreevy may have been more enthusiastic about humanism than Beckett, 
however. In 1943, he wrote an essay on St Francis of Sales, a sixteenth century bishop 
and writer, in which he describes Francis’s humanist education and explains how 
Francis took Montaigne ‘as his model in the matter of literary technique’. According 
to McGreevy, the humanistic perspective never left Francis, even once he became a 
bishop: 
 
humanism remained – by instinct and training Francis was, himself, a humanist 
– but now it was a Christianised humanism and all the more humane for 
accepting the implications of the Kingdom of God that is within every human 
being. (1943, 2) 
 
The poem ‘Arrangement in Gray and Black’, included in Poems, is dedicated ‘To the 
memory of a student of François de Sales’ (McGreevy, 1934, 55), and it is possible 
that McGreevy may have spoken to Beckett about the saint and his humanist 
associations during the 1930s. Then again, McGreevy’s Catholicism may have put a 
limit on his humanism: in his book on Eliot, he praises St Francis – although whether 
of Sales or of Assisi is not clear – for having ‘laughed and not ironically’ at the human 
condition: ‘He got rid of his human respect, and was not afraid of making a fool of 
himself’ (1931, 25).  
 From this evidence, it would seem that Beckett’s attribution of ‘humanism’ to 
his friend’s poetry was faint praise at best. But even if he found aspects of the 
‘human’ problematic, and was unlikely to sign up to a Christian humanism, Beckett 
may have found a variety of humanism more to his liking. In The History of 
Philosophy, the major source for Beckett’s autodidactic explorations of western 
thought during the 1930s, Wilhelm Windelband notes how Renaissance humanism 
‘reawakened older doctrines of Greek cosmology’, which included thinkers to whom 
Beckett was sympathetic such as Democritus, Epicurus, the Stoics and the Sceptics 
(1901, 353). Renaissance humanism informed the work of the English writer Robert 
Burton, whose explicitly Democritean book The Anatomy of Melancholy is frequently 
excerpted in Beckett’s Dream and Whoroscope notebooks (Pilling, 1999; UoR 
MS3000, 84r–85v). Windelband also discusses the Renaissance rediscovery of 
scepticism, by thinkers such as Sanchez and Montaigne, which instigated fresh doubts 
about the reliability of the senses: ‘Hence [the] empiricism of the Humanists now also 
threw itself more upon inner perception, which was universally regarded as much 
surer than outer perception’ (1901, 376). Given Beckett’s interest in ‘self-awareness’ 
(1984, 71) in both ‘Humanistic Quietism’ and another review essay from 1934, 
‘Recent Irish Poetry’, the humanism of Montaigne would seem a useful historical 
touchstone. ‘Strenuously as all these [humanist thinkers] urge toward looking at 
things themselves,’ writes Windelband, ‘outer perception ultimately turns out 
comparatively empty’ (1901, 376).  
 Already this ‘inner perception’ is starting to sound like something far more 
compatible with the silent, contemplative prayer of quietism. Beckett used the term 
‘quietism’ a number of times in his correspondence and reviews from the 1930s. He 
connects the quietist disposition with passages in Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks 
(Letter to A.J. Leventhal, 7 May 1934, qtd in Nixon, 2011, 55) and in Proust’s À la 
recherche du temps perdu (‘Proust in Pieces’; 1984, 65), with his cousin’s ‘étrange 
quadrupède’ [strange quadruped] of a horse (Letter to Morris Sinclair, 27 January 
1934, 2009b, 177) and, most importantly, with The Imitation of Christ by Thomas à 
Kempis, which McGreevy had recommended to him as a source of solace (2009b, 
257). Rachel Burrows’s notes to Beckett’s lectures on André Gide at Trinity College 
Dublin in 1930, refer to ‘Dostoevsky’s quietism’ (TCD MIC60, 12v) and, in the 
Whoroscope notebook, Beckett mentions ‘quietism oder was’ [or what] in early notes 
towards the structure of Murphy (qtd in Nixon, 2011, 55). 
 In a narrow historical sense, Quietism refers to a loose group of Catholic 
mystics in the seventeenth century, the most important being Miguel de Molinos 
(1628-1697), Madame Guyon (1648-1717) and François Fénelon (1651-1715). They 
all taught an approach to prayer that emphasised silence, passivity, resignation of the 
will, and the cultivation of ‘holy indifference’. In the prayer of quiet, a Christian was 
supposed to put aside all forms of mental imagery, spiritual striving, rational thought, 
and devotional exercises such as praying the rosary (Evans, 2009; Choudhury, 2009). 
Molinos, Guyon, and Fénelon were all persecuted for their teachings by the Catholic 
Church, and Quietism is still considered heresy today. The major details of Quietist 
teaching and history are outlined by William Inge in his Christian Mysticism, which 
Beckett read between 1931 and 1932, and which is quoted over several pages of the 
Dream notebook (Pilling, 1999, 97–102). Most importantly for my purposes here, 
Inge links McGreevy’s Christian humanist St Francis of Sales to Quietism, and this 
may have inspired Beckett’s title. After discussing Fénelon’s teaching that self-
interest must be excluded from love of God, Inge quotes St Francis of Sales: ‘the 
disinterested heart is like wax in the hands of its God’ (1899, 237). McGreevy also 
knew about this connection between his Christian humanist hero and the Quietists, 
describing Francis’s books as being ‘a formative influence on the great minds that 
were then coming to maturity’, including Fénelon’s (1943, 2). 
  A broader definition of quietism – without a capital Q – would include all other 
philosophies or religious teachings that encourage passivity and resignation of the 
will, and which aim at a state of indifference or mental quiet. Beckett reached this 
understanding of the term through the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, who, in 
the third volume of World as Will and Idea, defines quietism as ‘surrender of all 
volition, asceticism, i.e., intentional mortification of one’s own will’ and uses it to talk 
about Muslim, Buddhist, and Hindu ascetics as well as Christian ones such as Guyon 
and Molinos (1909, 3:433). Schopenhauer praised the disposition of all these quietists, 
while rejecting their individual religious dogmas. His own soteriology also focused on 
resignation of the will, and he stated that the concerns of ‘quietism and asceticism’ 
were ‘identical with that of all metaphysics and ethics’, and therefore something that 
philosophers should take more seriously (436). In Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the 
English Language, the entry for ‘Quietism’ is illustrated by a quotation from William 
Temple: 
 
What is called by the poets apathy or dispassion, by the scepticks indisturbance, 
by the Molinists quietism, by common men peace of conscience, seems all to 
mean by great tranquillity of mind. (1755, 1623) 
 
The ‘scepticks’ here are the ancient Greek Pyrrhonists whose therapeutic philosophy, 
like those of other the other two Hellenistic schools, Epicureanism and Stoicism, 
aimed at ataraxia: imperturbability of mind. These were also precisely the schools of 
thought which inspired Renaissance humanists mentioned by Windelband. 
 ‘Humanistic Quietism’, then, need not be an oxymoron. It might indicate an 
interest in the life of the mind and the study of the self, as practised by Montaigne as 
well as Beckett’s beloved Burton and McGreevy’s hero, Francis of Sales. In the next 
section, I will argue that the tension between a meliorist humanism and a 
resignationist quietism is one that Beckett found creatively productive. 
 
 
Protestantism, Solipsism, and Humility 
 
Beckett and McGreevy were close friends separated by their difference in religious 
belief. This has led Seán Kennedy to suppose that ‘Humanistic Quietism’ is a critique 
of McGreevy’s Catholic poetics. In particular, Kennedy thinks that Beckett was tacitly 
attacking McGreevy for living in a solipsistic mental world constructed by his own 
religious belief, and for forming a poetics based on Christian humility rather than 
individual artistic integrity. While Kennedy’s reading is enlightening and useful in 
many respects, he goes too far in depicting Beckett as a critic of inwardness and 
humility. Even if Beckett could not stomach the Catholicism of his friend, his 
ambivalent attitude towards religion means that he still retained a fondness for these 
two monkish virtues. 
 Beckett describes how McGreevy ‘evolves his poems’ from a ‘nucleus of 
endopsychic clarity’ (1984, 69). ‘Endopsychic’ literally means ‘in the mind’. Beckett 
probably took the term from Ernest Jones’s Papers on Psycho-Analysis that he was 
reading and taking notes on in 1934 (TCD MS10971/7, 1–20). There, Jones explains a 
set of mental forces known as the ‘endopsychic censor’, which ‘consists of various 
social and ethical inhibitions, the effect of which is to prevent the passage into 
consciousness of the mental processes, comprising the latent content’ (1913, 362). 
Beckett could be using the word in its literal sense, without alluding to Jones, in 
which case his point is that McGreevy is unusually clear about the workings of his 
own mind. Alternatively, if he did intend to allude to Jones, then the point is more 
derogatory: the innermost part of McGreevy’s mind, perhaps the subconscious, is very 
clear about what needs to be censored and suppressed in order for his Catholic poetry 
to ‘evolve’. Both readings seem plausible, and it is by no means clear which is to be 
preferred. The same is true of Beckett’s statement towards the end of the review that 
‘For the intelligent Amiel there is only one landscape’. This is a reference to the Swiss 
poet and philosopher Henri-Frédéric Amiel (1821-1881), who is best known for his 
extensive diary writing, published as Journal intime. The ‘landscape’, then, is the 
terrain of the mind and the self, perhaps what Amiel referred to as ‘la conscience de la 
conscience’ (1976, 2:441) [consciousness of consciousness]. As J. C. C. Mays points 
out, this comparison might not be flattering to McGreevy since it suggests that 
Beckett thought his poetry ‘was in one direction and was relatively colourless; that it 
drove towards a vacant, nameless consciousness’ (1995, 115). But it is not 
immediately clear that Beckett thought that this exploration of consciousness was a 
bad thing. In the Dream notebook he records a phrase which seems to be of his own 
coinage: ‘plung[e] à la Amiel into the Encyclopaedia of my subject’ (Pilling, 1999, 
132). Rather than being colourless and dull, the inner world of the aspiring Amiel 
might be as rich and fascinating as an encyclopaedia (Beckett was an avid reader of 
encyclopaedias in the 1930s and beyond). Beckett suggests as much several years 
later in his 1947 poem, ‘bon bon il est un pays’ [all right all right it is a country]: the 
mind is compared to ‘un pays sans traces’ [a trackless land] where ‘la tête est muette’ 
[the head is silent] and ‘il n’y a rien à pleurer’ [there is nothing to lament] (Beckett, 
2012, 115, my translation). Ackerley is surely right to say that this poem is both ‘a 
celebration of the realm of the mind and a grumble against the lack of time to explore 
it fully’ (2000, 89). We cannot, therefore, unambiguously assume that Beckett is 
being critical of McGreevy when he describes his poetry as inward or even solipsistic. 
It was, after all, the ‘Celtic drill of extraversion’ that Beckett really despised in poetry 
(1984, 73). 
 Kennedy may yet have a point, however. Beckett certainly seems to be more 
critical of McGreevy in this passage: 
 
To the mind that has raised itself to the grace of humility ‘founded’ – to quote 
from Mr McGreevy’s T. S. Eliot – ‘not on misanthropy but on hope’, prayer is 
no more (no less) than an act of recognition. A nod, even a wink. ... This is the 
adult mode of prayer syntonic to Mr McGreevy, the unfailing salute to his 
significant from which the fire is struck and the poem kindled (1984, 68; 
emphasis in original) 
 
Kennedy glosses this as follows: 
 
MacGreevy’s salute to God is unfailing: blind faith. And the significant 
involved – God as conceived in Catholic terms by MacGreevy – is very much 
MacGreevy’s own, his, and is not available to anyone that does not share his 
faith. Since his faith is unquestioning, God is always what MacGreevy believes 
him to be; hence prayer is always ‘an act of recognition. A nod, even a wink’. 
MacGreevy sees what he wants to see. (2005, 278) 
 
But even here there is ambiguity. John Pilling (2004, 118) contrasts McGreevy’s 
‘adult mode of prayer’ with what Beckett has to say about Rilke’s ‘childishness’ in a 
review for the Criterion in July 1934. There, Beckett criticises Rilke’s obsession with 
the ‘Ichgott’: the ‘interchangeability of Rilke and God’ whereby Rilke sees his own 
‘fidgets’ as something more lofty, such as ‘God, Ego, Orpheus and the rest’ (1984, 
66–7). This conflation of God and self is precisely what Kennedy thinks Beckett is 
accusing McGreevy of in ‘Humanistic Quietism’. But Beckett distinguishes the two 
poets by calling Rilke a child and McGreevy an adult. The two reviews were written 
at almost the same time, and so it is not unreasonable to expect Beckett’s vocabulary 
to be consistent. Pilling concludes that McGreevy is superior in Beckett’s estimations 
to Rilke since he ‘is operating on the basis that prayer, wheresoever it may be 
directed, is always orientated outwards’ (2004, 118). While I disagree that Beckett 
casts McGreevy’s prayer as outwardly directed, it must be the case that McGreevy is 
deemed not to be prey to the kind of deluded self-absorption as Rilke.  
 In the book T.S. Eliot: A study, which Beckett quotes, McGreevy claims that a 
degree of inner separation is actually necessary for the Christian life: 
  
The idea of our being, each one of us, in a prison, isolated from the rest, Mr. 
Eliot substantiates with a dull passage from F. H. Bradley’s Appearance and 
Reality. I think it was St. Augustine who expressed it most perfectly, at any rate 
most succinctly: ‘The soul of another is dark.’ The darkness, incidentally, is 
only the defect of a quality. For it is our isolation from each other that is our 
personal contact with God. … I mean that the isolation is itself the breath of the 
Kingdom of God that is in each one of us. (1931, 54–5) 
 
McGreevy would not, therefore, have necessarily seen Beckett’s comments on his 
inwardness as overtly critical. Even Beckett’s reference to God as ‘his significant’ is 
not so far from what McGreevy calls his ‘personal contact with God’. The passage 
also demonstrates the shared interests of the two men. Beckett’s Murphy is 
preoccupied with precisely the problem that McGreevy discusses here: the tension 
between a solitude that serves spirituality – although in Murphy’s case, not 
Catholicism but a mixture of Pythagoreanism, Democritean atomism, astrology, and 
Schopenhauerian quietism – and the need for communion and friendship with others. 
The narrator of Murphy notes the ‘unintelligible gulf’ between the patients at the 
Magdalen Mental Mercyseat and Murphy, who, despite being a ‘seedy solipsist’ is 
ultimately distressed by his exclusion from their ‘brotherhood’ (Beckett, 2009a, 149, 
53, 111). We are also told that ‘Murphy believed that there was no dark quite like his 
own dark’ (58): a possible allusion to the Augustinian maxim that McGreevy 
mentions. When McGreevy is given the chance to review Beckett’s poetry, writing in 
Ireland To-Day in October 1937, he turns the tables and points out Beckett’s own 
interest in the inner world: ‘Mr. Beckett is cloistered within himself … He is a poet of 
the cloistered self on whom experience is an intrusion’ (1937, 81). But this is not 
necessarily a piqued rejoinder to the content of ‘Humanistic Quietism’. Benjamin 
Keatinge (2013, 73) suggests that McGreevy is once again marking the differences 
between the Protestant and Catholic minds, and compares McGreevy’s comments on 
Beckett to his analysis of the ‘New England Eliot’ who remained under the sway of 
Puritanism before his conversion to Anglo-Catholicism. But this ignores McGreevy’s 
choice of words: there are few things less Protestant than a cloister, which stands 
synecdochically for the very thing that was ransacked and dissolved by Europe’s 
reformers. McGreevy then compares Beckett’s poetry to ‘the temper of The Imitation 
[of Christ]’. Rather than sparring with Beckett, McGreevy was surely trying to 
demonstrate the affinities that he felt his friend had with certain aspects of the 
Catholic contemplative tradition, just as he had done when he recommended The 
Imitation to Beckett in 1935. For McGreevy, an interest in inwardness is something he 
and Beckett share, and which is a healthy part of his Christian faith. 
 Beckett, however, was both attracted to and wary of inwardness: no doubt 
because, like Rilke, he was an apostate, and therefore more liable to turn inwardness 
into a dangerous solipsism than one who ‘always had Jesus for his darling’ (Beckett, 
2009b, 257). At times, he is drawn to it, as in the letter in which he approvingly 
discusses the ‘deanthropomorphizations of the artist’: 
 
Even the portrait is beginning to be dehumanised as the individual feels himself 
more & more hermetic & alone & his neighbour a coagulum as alien as a 
protoplast or God, incapable of loving or hating anyone but himself or of being 
loved or hated by anyone but himself. (2009b, 223) 
 
This anticipates Murphy’s godlike and self-directed amor intellectualis (Beckett, 
2009a, 69), but it was not long before Beckett started to see the downside of such 
inwardness. In a much-discussed letter of March 1935, Beckett told McGreevy how 
he had ‘twisted’ a ‘very baroque solipsism’ from The Imitation of Christ which 
McGreevy had recommended as a possible source of solace for Beckett’s anxiety 
problems (Beckett, 2009b, 258). Beckett explains that because of his lack of religious 
belief, he was forced to make a ‘substitution of terms’ and replace Thomas à 
Kempis’s references to God with his ‘own feathers and entrails’ (257). Consequently 
he found himself delving into self, instead of seeking communion with the deity. The 
result was an ‘abject self-referring quietism’, ‘isolationism’ and a ‘crescendo of 
disparagement of others & myself’ (257–8). This, he adds, was what led him to seek 
out psychotherapy in 1933. It would seem that one of Beckett’s withering comments 
about Rilke applies just as much to himself: in his writing there is ‘the overstatement 
of the solitude which he cannot make his element’ (1984, 66). Most importantly, there 
is a sense in the letter that Beckett feels his own incurable lack of religious belief to be 
an obstacle or a hindrance in his search for solace. 
 Kennedy also argues that Beckett took issue with McGreevy’s belief in the 
virtue of humility. He points out that the quote from McGreevy’s Eliot book – 
‘humility ... founded not on misanthropy but on hope’ – comes from a passage in 
which Protestantism is roundly criticised: 
 
even in [Eliot’s] early poems there were traces of a capacity for self-criticism, 
for humility, that penitential Catholic virtue, founded not on misanthropy but on 
hope, that is so utterly alien to the puritanical mind. (McGreevy, 1931, 16) 
 
In quoting this passage, Kennedy argues, Beckett ‘takes a subtle swipe at the sectarian 
discriminations on which McGreevy’s aesthetic is based’ (2005, 277). According to 
Kennedy, Beckett was unable to accept McGreevy’s Catholic virtue of humility, and 
replaced it in his aesthetics and ethics with a ‘new, more avowedly Protestant, priority 
– “integrity”’ which is ‘synonymous with self-reliance’ (283). But even if Beckett had 
problems with Catholicism, he still had a number of ‘low church’ models of humility 
at his disposal, not least from his reading of André Gide’s Dostoïevsky in 1930 which 
formed the basis of his teaching on Gide at Trinity College Dublin that same year. In a 
lecture, Beckett explained how Gide was influenced by Dostoevsky, particularly the 
‘Humilité of Dost[oevsky]’ and his ‘Renouncement’ which ‘accommodate[s] 
complexity with humility’ (TCD MIC60, 23). The lecture notes of his student Rachel 
Burrows give the impression that Beckett was particularly pained to emphasise Gide’s 
Protestant upbringing: 
 
Protestant background which has endured, encouraged by Dost[oevsky]. 
Renunciation.  
Protestant & iconoclast  
Influenced by Protestantism  
Protestantism explains most of his characters  
Summary  Protestant &  Iconoclast – Prot in all that Fr. Protism implies 
(TCD MIC60, 14, 31, 37, 44) 
 
Gide himself stresses Dostoevsky’s vehement dislike of the Catholic Church and says 
that humility is so embedded in the Russian psyche that it can be found even among 
souls who lack the Christian faith (Gide, 1923, 226, 15). So despite the arguments of 
Kennedy – and indeed McGreevy – humility need not be incompatible with 
Protestantism or even atheism, nor is humility something which Beckett necessarily 
scorns. In fact, he seems to have appreciated the way in which humility leads Gide to 
a ‘quality of inconclusiveness’ and ‘integrity of incoherence’ (TCD MIC60, 43, 37). 
Precisely what Kennedy sees as a replacement for humility – integrity – appears in 
Beckett’s lecture as a product of it. 
 Two years after writing ‘Humanistic Quietism’, Beckett would find himself 
fascinated, ‘without knowing why exactly’ (Letter to Thomas McGreevy, 5 March 
1936; Beckett, 2009b, 319), by yet another low church advocate of humility: Arnold 
Geulincx, a Flemish Occasionalist philosopher who attempted to reconcile 
Cartesianism with Protestant Christianity. Beckett ‘heartily’ recommended Geulincx’s 
Ethica to his friend Arland Ussher, in a letter of 25 March 1936, particularly the 
‘second section of the second chapter of the first tractate, where he disquires on his 
fourth cardinal virtue, Humility, contemptus negativus sui ipsius’ [negative self-
contempt] (2009b, 329). Beckett’s own transcriptions from the Ethica concentrate 
disproportionately on this section (Geulincx, 2006, 326). While Beckett may have 
preferred a different kind of humility to his friend McGreevy, it is hard to see him 
rejecting McGreevy’s position on the virtue outright. 
 In the opaque final paragraph of ‘Humanistic Quietism’, Beckett explains how 
humility and self-awareness work might work together: 
 
To know so well what one values is, what one’s value is, as not to neglect those 
occasions (they are few) on which it may be doubled, is not a common faculty; 
to retain in the acknowledgement of such enrichment the light, calm and finality 
that composed it is an extremely rare one. 
 
What Beckett seems to be advocating here is self-knowledge that is as free from 
narcissism as it is from self-loathing. He wants the poet to be sufficiently aware of his 
or her own worth and priorities, while still being able to see where both these things 
might be enhanced (‘doubled’). And then, once the enhancement (‘enrichment’) of the 
poet’s worth and priorities has taken place, the poet should still retain his or her initial 
quasi-quietistic composure of ‘light, calm and finality’, and not be overthrown by 
self-aggrandisement. Why? Because this lightness and calm is what ‘composed’ the 
enrichment of the poet’s value and concerns in the first place. Again, this seems to 
indicate both self-awareness and humility. My reading of this final paragraph would 
fit with what Beckett says elsewhere in the review about the union of humility and 
hope, and the mid-point between the abject publican and the proud Pharisee. It also 
demonstrates the productive tension of the article’s oxymoronic title: humanism 
provides the melioristic attitude while quietism provides the humility. Taken together 
they lead to healthy self-knowledge. In effect, what Beckett is advocating is precisely 
the opposite of the ‘abject self-referring quietism’ that he would admit to having 
‘twisted’ from The Imitation of Christ in 1935. Whereas this solipsistic quietism gave 
rise to both arrogance and self-loathing, a humanistic quietism might bring about a 
genuine humility coupled with a clear sense of ‘one’s value’ and worth. 
 
 
Poetry and Prayer 
 
The Quietist controversy of the seventeenth century was, above all, a controversy 
about how to pray. It is appropriate then, that Beckett should discuss prayer at several 
points in ‘Humanistic Quietism’: 
 
All poetry, as discriminated from the various paradigms of prosody, is 
prayer. A poem is poetry and not Meistergesang, Vaudeville, Fragrant 
Minute, or any of the other collects for the day, in so far as the reader 
feels it to have been the only way out of the tongue-tied profanity.  
 
Beckett’s distinction between a true prayer/poem and the ‘collects for the day’ echoes 
his insistence to Nuala Costello earlier in the year that one of his own poems was ‘a 
prayer and not a collect’ (2009b, 188). The daily collect is a short, structured prayer 
said during services in the Anglican and Catholic churches. Beckett seems to be 
objecting both to the collects’ ritualistic recitation – whereas true prayer is a 
spontaneous utterance of last resort, the ‘only way out’ – and to their social nature. 
One of Beckett’s anti-poetic collects, the Meistergesang, refers to an inherently social 
poetic movement from the middle ages. Beckett probably discovered the term in J. G. 
Robertson’s History of German Literature, which forms the basis of his ‘Notes on 
German Literature’ (TCD MS10971/1). Robertson chides the Meistersingers for their 
‘artistic barrenness’ and ‘slavery to tradition’, and accuses them of hampering the 
growth of individual genius and inspiration (1902, 158–61). The reference to 
‘Fragrant Minute’ makes a similar point, since it denotes of a popular series of 
‘homely little verses’ which appeared in the Daily Graphic and later the Daily Herald 
during the 1920s and 1930s (Lang, 1999, 115). The column was written by 
Wilhelmina Stitch, a pseudonym of journalist Ruth Cohen, and offered reflection on 
such subjects as diverse as friendship, gratitude, dreams, public transport, 
housekeeping, and bereavement. They were insipid daily platitudes designed for mass 
consumption, and therefore far from Beckett’s poetic ideal. Beckett told McGreevy in 
1932 that he was ‘in mourning for the integrity of a pendu’s emission of semen, what 
I find in Homer & Dante & Racine & sometimes Rimbaud, the integrity of the eyelids 
coming down before the brain knows of grit in the wind’ (2009b, 134–5). Decades 
later, in ‘Enough’, Beckett juxtaposes ‘the ejaculations and broken paternosters’ 
(1995, 188): this first word is appropriate to both the aforementioned ‘emission’ but 
also to a prayer uttered in an emergency. This is the kind of prayer that Beckett wants, 
rather than the ritualised, planned, and sociable collect. Furthermore, it is this 
prayerful attitude that is most important for distinguishing a poem from other kinds of 
text, over and above the ‘paradigms of prosody’ that would make such a distinction 
based on versification or what Beckett calls ‘mere metre’. 
 Beckett then explains that a ‘prayer may be “good” in Dante’s sense on any note 
between and inclusive of the publican’s whinge and the pharisee’s tarantara’. The 
second half of the sentence is clear enough, since it refers to the parable told by Jesus 
(Luke 18:9–14) about two men who enter the temple to pray. While the Pharisee gives 
thanks that he is holier than others, the publican (tax collector) asks God for mercy. 
Jesus says the publican is more justified in the eyes of the Lord, and warns: ‘every one 
that exalteth himself shall be abased; and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted’. 
Mary Bryden suggests Beckett is making a ‘contrast between inner and outer, between 
insecurity and bold certainty’ and that although ‘both tendencies … may be 
productive of competent poetry’, a ‘middle ground between abasement and posturing’ 
is to be preferred (1998, 11–12), which would fit with my conclusions from the 
previous section. 
 
It is less clear, however, what ‘“good” in Dante’s sense’ means. It is possible that 
Beckett was thinking of Cantos 10–11 of the Purgatorio, which describe the ascent of 
the pilgrim and Virgil to the first terrace of Mount Purgatory, where they hear a 
recitation of the Lord’s Prayer. On this terrace, sinners are being cleansed of their 
pride: carved into the rock around them are statues of beings who exemplify humility, 
including the Archangel Gabriel, whose likeness is so convincing that the pilgrim 
could have sworn ‘ch’el dicesse “Ave!”’ [that he was saying “Ave!”] (Dante Alighieri, 
2003, 160, 10.40), and ‘l’umile salmista’ [the humble psalmist] David (10.65). Since 
Beckett says that McGreevy’s poems are like a ‘flag dipped in Ave, not hauled down 
in Misere’ later, referring to Gabriel’s greeting to Mary (Luke 1:28 and 1:48) and 
David’s Psalm 51, this Canto seems a likely reference point. The paraphrase of the 
Lord’s prayer, spoken by the proud shades, begins Canto 11, and, as Robert Durling 
notes, ‘stresses the respects in which [the prayer] enjoins humility’ (Dante Alighieri, 
2003, 180). This would fit with the importance of humility in Beckett’s review. Once 
the shades have finished their prayer, Dante remarks that they were asking for ‘buona 
ramogna’ [good progress] for themselves, as well as Virgil and the pilgrim; this might 
be the ‘good’ that Beckett quotes in ‘Humanistic Quietism’. Later on in Canto 11, the 
pilgrim asks how a soul can ascend to the second terrace if it ‘là giù dimora e qua sù 
non ascende, / se buona oraziön lui non aita, / prima che passi tempo quanto visse’ 
[must stay down there and not come up here, if good prayer does not help it, for as 
long a time as it lived] (11.129–31): this refers to the ante-purgatory where the pilgrim 
and Virgil had met Belacqua, the character appropriated by Beckett as his alter-ego in 
More Pricks than Kicks and Dream of Fair to Middling Women. When Murphy 
indulges ‘his Belacqua fantasy’ and imagines himself in the ante-purgatory, in 
Belacqua’s ‘embryonal repose’, he hopes that ‘no godly chandler would shorten his 
time with a good prayer’ (Beckett, 2009a, 51). A prayer that is ‘“good” in Dante’s 
sense’ might, then, mean a prayer in which a proud person humbles himself in the aim 
of furthering his own moral standing in the eyes of God and progressing towards 
paradise. Translated from Dante’s theological framework into Beckett’s aesthetic one, 
this would refer to the way a poet seeks ‘enrichment’ through humility and self-
knowledge, as I argued in the previous section. But neat as this reading might be, it is 
difficult to reconcile this with the fact that Beckett says that this ‘good’ prayer can be 
found ‘between and inclusive of’ the two extremes of the whinging publican and the 





The apparent oxymoron of the title ‘Humanistic Quietism’ is, in the end, apposite for 
a piece of writing which is so concerned about what lies ‘between’ extremes and 
which reflects so many of Beckett’s own inner conflicts, both artistic and personal, 
from this period. The ‘poison and antidote’ that the narrator of The Unnamable finds 
in religion applies just as well to the constituent concepts of this review: prayer, 
humanism, quietism, self-awareness, and humility can all threaten creativity just as 
easily as they can enrich it. The pitfalls are – respectively – ritualism, hubris, 
abjection, solipsism, and self-loathing, while the potential fruits of these attitudes are 
spontaneity, radical interior empiricism, inner calm, honesty, and artistic integrity. In 
treading so narrow a path through this difficult conceptual territory, it is perhaps 
understandable that Beckett occasionally contradicts himself, as my analysis of 
Dante’s ‘good’ prayer would suggest he did. As in ‘Dante … Bruno . Vico .. Joyce’, 
Beckett seems to have resisted the temptation to ‘make a really tidy job of it’, 
preferring the ‘coincidence of contraries’ in his ‘handful of abstractions’ (Beckett, 
1984, 19). And even though I have courted the danger of the ‘neatness of 
identifications’, this essay cannot pretend to have brought brilliance to all of the murk 
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